This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.
Preface; Sir Michael Palliser Acknowledgements Abbreviations Maps Introduction Power and Influence 1945-58 Three Roles 1959-1964 Labour in Charge: Reassessing Defence Priorities Spreading the Butter Too Thin: Military Capabilities versus Political Commitments Vietnam, the Pound and Britain's Role East of Suez The Decision to Withdraw from Aden and Singapore: The Defence Review June-December 1965 The Completion of the Defence Review January-February 1966 The Choice between Europe and 'East of Suez' March-December 1966 The Final Verdict: January 1967-January 1968 Conclusion Notes and References Select Bibliography Index
