This work examines the evolution of the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF's) logistic and administrative infrastructure in France and its impact on operations. In so doing, it challenges the popular notion of British generals as bungling incompetents by analyzing an all too often ignored, but crucial, facet of military campaigns. While the BEF may be found wanting in some areas, administration was not one of them. The British generals proved themselves to be thoroughly modern professional officers in the manner in which they solved the ongoing crises that attended the explosive growth of the BEF and its artillery-intensive style of warfare. This study reinvigorates the debate about World War I by examining the understudied field of logistics.
Illustrations
Introduction
Preparation for a Modern War?: The Staff College and Prewar Staff Training
War Plans and Reality: The BEF and the Commitment to a Continental War
Escalation and Reality: The BEF's Move toward Becoming a Continental Army and the Exercise of "Per Diem" as a Control on Battle
Breakdown: The Battle of the Somme and the Near-Collapse of the Transportation System
The End of Ad Hocism: Sir Eric Geddes's Reorganization of the BEF's Transportation System and the Arrival of Forecasting
Geddes's Legacy: Transportation in France and Its Impact on Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Decision Making in 1917
The Challenge of Mobility: Haig's Administration, Operational Success, and the Return of Movement to the Western Front
Failure?: The System Breaks Down after the Armistice
Conclusion
Selected Bibliography
Index
